

Cuba: II

- In first week: preoccupation with SU
- "horizontal escalation" - esp. if SU troops are killed -  
Brest: Berlin, <sup>East</sup> Turkey, Quing-Matam, <sup>Vietnam</sup> Korea, Pakistan,  
Finland; maybe attempt to ~~to~~ <sup>overthrow</sup> <sup>Vietnam, Berlin, Hungary,</sup>  
Czechs, <sup>Don-Rub</sup> Laos.
- No discussion (?) of problems (with SU - or even Castro) in Cuba,  
or Caribbean.
- Against (except Nife?) - problem was political  
not military-strategic  
yet "mines must go"

Aware of problem of explaining w/ members in  
Turkey was OK, but not in Cuba.

- On horizontal esc: No (?) notion of area; yet  
and US "area" of (military) strength - in such areas - and will  
certainly inhibit SU <sup>in Cuba</sup> action.

Wishing SU would conquer the of US will;  
yet it would make determiner of whether SC  
action elsewhere less reliable, because it would  
create (2) some need to attack/respond as in  
US case! (Prestige, will, avoiding subordination)  
and (b) lead to angry, impulsive, reckless response.

- Concern about legality (not in Adelman: an country,  
(like de Gaulle) show lack of inhibition about laws "with  
US seeing at stake" (How was it?)

any attn - because of Adelman & domestic opinion:  
(Adelman, presumably, thought "strong action" would  
bring Adelman back on "leadership.")

- Suggestions: we might give up threats  
or (RFE) give/delegate rights to Russ (if SU understood)  
let French use in NTS.

Angel May 923-9252 machine

R 923-1020

2739 Laguna St 94123

can with car April 12

Virginia State: better of family

Wants to discuss



Current  
Pres: need to "sing one song." All must support  
the final decision. [Consensus:] "Every course  
taken, the other would have been better."

[No Bay of Pigs / Bombs.

No Challenger / Thiolol

No VN 64-65 / Ball (Clifford, etc.)

Such known ~~discrete~~ contradictions: "Another course  
~~was~~ perceived as possible, and ~~as~~ as better of it  
least one who had the same info as the others —

Discrete is not wholly second-guessing, with  
knowledge unavailable at the time..."

Alternative:  
could have better

or, shocky,  
discreetly

or, regarding <sup>hidden</sup> ~~debate~~  
or more convincing

(was dismissed  
so readily?)

① Pres is  
"questioned" on process of  
decision, and on result

② not just on result  
(whether or not  
advisable or not)

③ has rights for jobs

|| This, "total <sup>or lack of, profound</sup> lack of awareness" of attraction,  
or of this possible both effects, "ignorance  
is an excuse."

But certain risks — if perceived as such —

(a) not be chosen

(b) or at least, not without further investigation

and (c) exploration, generation of attraction

and (d) consultation

and (e) warning to others, who might be endangered  
or who have right and  
power to block decision.

(- "Why was not Challenger delayed?

Why was not NASA top officials, and Pres, informed?

" were not astronauts told?

Jan 1989: lack of "terrorist warning" to passengers on plane blown up

|| R: Don't say we considered in strike. No attraction."

Ball first mention: That is as another VC action: mistake or VA.

Jayson: Why don't we relax about it. Treat it as another target.

McN: No mil. threat justifying response. What is main response?

July 14th: Note to R: We would just have to eat the Rogers. (decision a bloody mess.  
As since better, it's  
not good.

McN, 20th: Removal right require threats, inhibits to be paid.

Cuba II

Good section

To do nothing is dangerous

- Domestically (unsaid)

- Berlin

[Defines "crisis"]

[See Kershner +  
Jovanovic: risk-  
preference]

(Def. of "crisis")

+ "desperation" (riskless)

or: to do nothing (current course)

("Current course is hopeless;

leads to desperation:

consider. of dangerous acts  
✓, illegal...

that "might" work; or that

find better, as reactions, than

"doing nothing" (thus, hundreds

of risks...) (If right

"help" — given that "doing nothing"

cannot succeed, finds helpless.)

or unpleasant  
event, former

used, abstract:

Desire to "keep control of developments" (aiming to win  
never back, or stop part...)

Acheson says, blockade gives the initiative, control.

But would we "keep control" if we stuck?

Fear that Ultimate will both provide warning  
and will lead to counter-ultimatum.  
(and pressure from Allies)

Post-crisis focus/plan could have been on hand

historically — Stevenson

(Only one (?) who wanted Ch after 17 Oct: that  
no

was the rule! Others, too, were "super-dooms"  
on first reaction: 15, 16, 17 Oct

also, give Pres initial  
slow reaction.



Oct 89

Issues:

- Gov. control over military
- Military resistance to NOD, or to lack of <sup>only</sup> counter-offensive  
or to unilateral measures
- This, likelihood of SC unilateral measures toward NOD
- SC attitude toward balance in Europe

and/or toward prospects for offensive

and/or worth of offensive cap.

[SC unilat. suggests SC demand toward NATO

"optimal" membership, Poland, ... Estonia

on one or both counts (balance, offensive)

though they might have concluded that, although  
they were strong, & stronger (they say this) it wasn't  
worth it, or balance.

## Election time

Maybe K did want to wait till after election to use  
numbers politically: so as 1) to minimize effect of Right pressure  
on JFK to act; 2) to avoid max. angry reactions of JFK (who then could not  
move ahead)

Ask Lums

(But - did he not worry about mission  
before election, to win election?! as what I was  
hoping, in 1960!

How later this?!  
~~to be~~

This, as he said, avoid giving JFK (max) trouble  
before election.

(Get?  
told me to hst, Nov? 1969 - "What do you  
have in mind?"

(see my "helping" LSC et al. by not telling him  
of MNN, Kibb, Wanda  
was & wrong? I don't see it.

To Rumsfeld, my destroying hst:

I had just saved him - 1970 - from Physics Div.

(inbound - greeted, along with RAND letter -  
had already known him. with his exception)

Hyp: (see Page p. 6: McN)

blockade run as necessary prelude to  
deal (on Timing)

(as. Stevenson: do it now then  
JFK hardly right, on testes,  
was + SU  
and to Right)

Strategy (McN):

Blockade, the

negot/deal.

(and do it before  
as strike then was)

(Why would K give up 2d objective,  
every balance (which only deal prelude; was not  
only for sup, but also peace. - /RBMS; SU deal)  
unless: 1) blocked from it, by blockade



ask laws:

Were not VFR warnings too late: minutes about/already  
there, in Cuba?

Was this considered, by RFR/Sor/R, JFR?

Was it like UK bilateral commitment to Poland, after Prague  
— imply a path to a crisis / potential escalation?

(Did Politburo wrong, at this point?)

Why not?

Could K have withdrawn?

e.g. after JFK - Kennedy talk?

K already thought: JFK has not decided to do X (what) if A.

or if he has — HAD HE, BY MKG STANDARDS? —

he will change his mind

(as Bligh)

WRONG

Note SNIE, Oct 17: K will have planned/decided what  
to do if this fails.

of VN, too;

1) [Lesson: That is after unbridled if with will;  
not even, seriously weighed, considered, planned, calculated;  
"we'll see; we'll cross that bridge..."]

2. On the other hand, a "warning" to every  
(to reassure our public / readers) my lead to planning &  
preps — to keep advocates of action within Admin (JCS, Defense)  
from leading to outside circles that no such preps are  
going on ("a bluff") —

which do shape feasible options — some ready,  
others not prepared — if contingency was mine,  
or if some other, unforeseen challenge arises

(brink/cocking of crisis)

or one is angry, inhibited, frustrated — ready for violence.

"boldness"

"manliness" =

Feb 5, 1989

For Louis: Centralization:

(i) K saw US as acting illegally in Cuba  
at proposals of illegal invasions;

and when did  
K expect invasion?  
What if it came  
first?

(Oct 20!)

just thought US would accept minors (and give  
up invasion) once they were there?

US fear of CUA?

or if low retal, if minors attacked?

(duplex low inferiority, again),

after minors destroyed?

Very unpleasant in Cuba — as to

capture; any cover for that?

For instability? (extreme!)

(2) US would blow up if SO announced study;

just will accept if done as FA

[but what if discovered?] ad own at public affairs  
(see on 0-21) of big kind to.

Blatant: and one (no US) to buy up peace (of rights)  
as the issue, that made a crisis inevitable.

He wanted cheap peace; but thought  
mistakenly (as did MCN!) that they were  
"strong enough to assert peace."

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or, the first step toward it.

and peace came 10 years later. (1972!)

(Feb: yes)

For Louis: 1, or 2 RFK-Dole meetings?

Had RFK, on Busch, hinted at Irish deal?

For Louis: My impression JFK had not decided to  
invade (i.e. 48 hrs) on Oct 27; believe, on Oct 1-6!

3) Wanted to call later idea Oct 27 planning + hints,  
like Oct 1-15 planning, "routine contingency planning"?!

6) Note: the talk of his "contingency planning" with Rush — Conrad  
as if he had decided 1) to settle on K's terms, if necessary; 2) not to  
threaten.



cf.  
Alexeev article on CII

1988

Feb 5, 1988

For Lovers:

- Were more missiles intended?!

By hint?

- Wf much to construct after Oct 22?

- Wf was B K's move a "adventure" — given that  
the risks were, apparently, not seen by any advisors  
involved? Should it have foreseen US response?!

(Exclusion of ... American experts?)

[First stage of a Faint Acropolis is now  
like a Covert Action: it has the risks + limitations  
of a CA — and the  
temptations...

- Who proposed Jimmy deal to Delors? When? 309

Note: after all the lesson-learning:

VN

Opposition (Cyberpunkin)

The end now

What lessons were really learned — by whom?

(e.g., by successors to JFK and K  
and their advisors? (and!))

- Wf the message in Berlin, + message in elections  
(to state a US warning / commitment in Berlin?)

SHOULD US (JFK) RESPONSE HAVE BEEN FORESEEN?

WITH WHAT PROB?

WHY? AS DEPENDING ON WHAT?

If so, what do we infer

about the risk of war / war  
war!

US MILITARY SUPERIORITY?  
US EMPIRE / TRADITION IN CARIB?

US LAWLESSNESS? MILITARISM?

US DEMAND FOR RECOGNITION OF

SUPERIOR RIGHTS, STATUS?

(UNREADINESS FOR EQUAL TREATMENT?

HUMILIATION OF PRESIDENT

297 300

363

Reference:

Either JFK never really wanted to invade  
(but speculate, etc)

or prospect of war with Soviets deterred him.  
(~~clashes~~ from USSR VN, Korea)

(like attacking China, 1949, or after 1950, or in VN  
or many North China. Does he do it.)

(But N did; + did)

Beas in. Should he have considered  
at that time?)

2. Was belief that US wouldn't discuss (from air)

crisis?

If concealed? (Latter factor to speculate?)

SE rather was discussed; and seeing in SU.  
from rats

Then belief is very, was precise crisis?

(Look at JFK, McN, inhibitions in air stable  
or mission)

and/or: was K assumption that just before election

(Constitution phase) JFK would keep secret

[Hyp: He wants to invade Cuba, but not

to fight Soviets; and Soviet invade

is assured by pressure [troops would do this—

he and those too? But he also wanted

to avoid balance]; JFK will want to back

off. So, he went and pressure on him for attack before election

(No Russian has said this; but it could be

plausible — SU troops and inside pressure is detected,

not "operational" — i.e. there is no "officially unusable, but

promoted "force" — US has to assume operational about from this

of pressure [possibility of inside hidden and then!]



Oct 89

## Ask Lows

- on <sup>SU</sup> interpretation of

- 1973 <sup>US</sup> Alert = ME (see Meefwein, 219)

Principles

- Joshi Half attack (Did Lows see concrete  
or absence of attack?)

- Plinder (Kargy visit)

- Attack on US: Brink's, Bin Naa, Plinder

|| - Wf that version its East Germany  
"world war," or making war "inevitable"?

- State fear of Western invasion

(Meefwein)

- SS-18 (How does it differ from SS-20?)

(<sup>meat IV</sup> test see you on Julia speech?)

see Meefwein

darabier, FA 8-88  
1005

("error: SS-20

officer

KAL-007

(Gorbachev final Sept 1984

Krasnoyarsk

(Making (?) Ortega come to Moscow?

198... (was that Gorbachev?)

RUST, May 87

I think harder.)

- JER buildup after Gorbachev

- MCN Ann Arbor speech

- Gorbachev speech

- What were SU and in Berlin, 1958-62, 1962  
Cline

see by  
Liuwen  
ans, for 82

Perestroika

5 Nov 89

- Ask Sovs: How much is all this due to  
Carter-Rogan "policy of strength,"  
build-up?  
To SDE?

- Was that necessary, given Holbrooke?

- Did it help bring Holbrooke, or New Thinking?

- ~~What~~ Were there alternate ways to bring this -  
under B, A, C?

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- Is US economy the best model?

Statedman?

(A pity that prestigious economists now  
are Regonites!

It should have been:

Hittis & Banks?

Alphons, Fung?

Shawn?

Reich

Dick Parker

Leontis?

Fred Block?

David?

Seungye, MR...

How about: Walt Henry, esp. SDP

Amelia, Scandman  
Japan?

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NT? Elmwood's/Copra's New Paradigm?!  
(Didn't & give Volokov The Young Point?



5 Nov 89

- Ask Soes:

- What did you and /pang see as the  
occasion for this blitzing?

- or, what were the duties?

- Did they see convergence of troops?

- What if this was' there on WTO?

(or McCain

or Sargent: SU MIC

and later

Gorbachev and Bush)

SOVS NOW TAKE SERIOUSLY

(SAUL MENDLOWITZ'S) AIM: PREVENTION OF WAR

(esp. "would war";

US-SU non-use war  
NATO -

Numer: and to change: — direction of East Eur,  
which requires an offensive  
WTO strategy

- and has needs of encouraging  
NATO intention

(Rogers: Huntington)

- ~~What~~ - SU non-use offensive  
poster

- (not of prevention,  
but COW, CUA,

MCN: { early "second use"  
{ (or any second use)

(Realistically, any second use is bad/fatal for  
for SU survival.) (as for US)

Sunday 3 Oct 87

Z

for - send Fed express?

Reifer - library:

Stirling Good

MCB?

When are specials? Who?

media

Cozy Shann

When do they need word?

Loyal Shaver

Lyule?

Hersh

What can they do?

Commission

MHH [how to say?]

Kittler

Find Kaplan - Jan Olfendick

Klar

Allison

Bernstein

(Maz)

Kittler

Reinstatt

Posner

Blight - Blight 1/2 dozen

Franklin

Wade

Lebow

Van Evers

Heathoff

(Havelick)

Heathoff

Landau

Kayser

IF Stone

Rathjens

Zim

Forsberg

Chomsky

Mack

Sherris

Hoffman?

Schilling

Rye

Comm Houghton

914-682-0488

R 964-0074

Did Carter say to Lyule - not just "Sovs controlled/delivered" but

U Thant memoirs: View from the UN (Harden City, N.Y.,

Darbliday 1978, p. 128

"The plot, Cubans did not...?"



Blight 3 Oct 87

[Hyp: Put Klare to sponsor a scholarly seminar on  
either Oct 14, 15 or 16 or Oct 9? (Friday  
- invite Howard - MIT list - Brandeis (faculty?)

and Klare  
letters +  
docs

- Klare to attract media attention:

Talbott, Time

Woodward?

Fred Kaplan, Globe - or Chiphart

Jed Kappell

PBS, PRS... (Mankiewicz)

NYT - O'Ed (Hush)

- Check first:

\* Hantsoff<sup>W</sup>

Saunders<sup>W</sup> (Hush)

Ball<sup>NY?</sup>

(Russians?) at Howard

McCastro - London

\* Kalgaen<sup>C</sup>

McG B ? NY

(Szule?)

Frangui?

Zerin?

Riddge (Consul - General)<sup>NY</sup>

\* Rathgens

Ruvia?

(Fubini ?!)

Hush - sources?

Explains (w/ earlier optimism?)

What can he do/suggest?

(re-read: Nitze

my notes

Discretion

Print ASW

Howard + Rand

Klunder

Hilman

~~several~~

Hotel  
Havana Rivera, Havana Cuba

305-051

Saul Kunder

102-880-

Fawcett - Santa Rosa

Blight:

Mon - Wed

2:30

300 students

Museum Age Hist. + Humanities Center  
Research

Frankenberg - Tractable

Prof. Michael Klare  
Vassar College  
Amherst

01002

Belmont - Shuman  
Medford - Truett  
Shuman

484-9035

19 Francis Rd.  
Belmont

02178

(leave I  
relayed this

USC - By Hush -

Bart Bernstein

KPFA Ray Contine

'Phone to know health  
of you.

Oct 9, 9 AM - with  
Valley + Ross Belmont  
841-4723

Cody Shuman

202-462-6070

ff. 391-0343

Medford

News. 02155

26 Westbury  
Poughkeepsie